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See, September the 11th changed the equation. It used to be that oceans
would protect us, that we saw a threat, we didn’t have to worry about it
because there was two vast oceans. And we could pick and choose as to
how we deal with the threat. That changed on September the 11th.
George W. Bush, April 2004
GEOPOLITICS AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
Geopolitics is about the political organization of space, and about how this is conceived, represented, and
used in political discussion. The term refers to power at the largest of scales and simultaneously to the
geographical arrangements of that power. It is linked directly to European modes of conceiving the world as
a whole and then discussing how it is divided and ruled by many political organizations (Agnew 2003).
Inevitably it has a military dimension because political power is never entirely divorced from matters of
coercion and violence. Strategy and political power have unavoidable geographical dimensions, but ones that
are not always well understood by either politicians or the publics who advocate the use of military force. 
But first and foremost geopolitics is about the initial specification of the world in ways that subsequently
facilitate policy in the world presented in that particular manner. Thus places with certain attributes can be
presented as requiring certain policies. Modes of conduct are tied to these prior contextualisations in much
policy discourse, a simple but obvious point that is so unremarkable as to frequently pass without comment.
In the aftermath of September 11th 2001 the world was remapped in the political discourses of the war on
terror (Dalby 2003). Initially it was unclear what the appropriate geography was to specify what had
happened; ‘9/11,’ a temporal designation rather than a geographical one, is still used to specify the new
circumstances. But remapped the world was, into the categories of the Bush doctrine and its ‘global war on
terror’.
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a label attached to discussions of the modernization of the U.S.
military particularly in the last couple of decades, but has implications for other military forces too (Sloan
2002). The term is used loosely to refer both to technological innovations in weapon systems, and in
particular the important changes wrought by computer technologies and communication systems. Most
obvious in the “smart” weapons publicly revealed in the 1991 Gulf war, the technological innovations are
supported by global positioning navigation systems and numerous communications technologies that enhance
command systems and situational awareness on the part of commanders. Remote sensors and computer
tracking of numerous targets supposedly allow sophisticated combat operations to out maneuver foes and
destroy opposition targets relatively easily with few casualties. This requires a reorganization of armed forces
with large tank and infantry divisions broken into smaller units to be more flexible and capable of moving
much faster over long distances. In the phrase usually used by Donald Rumsfeld (2002) when he was
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American Defense Secretary, the RMA required nothing less than the ‘transformation’ of the American
military. Not least is the requirement that the various services have much greater capabilities of working
together in ‘joint’ operations, and have that capability literally anywhere on earth. 
But military innovations are not new; historical analogies with contemporary developments are always
tempting, but need to be addressed cautiously if appropriate lessons are to be drawn for present discussions
(Boot 2006). One could start with a discussion of Alexander the Great and suggest that his father Phillip, king
of Macedonia, had initiated a revolution in military affairs by perfecting a combined arms military machine,
effectively linking phalanx, mobile infantry, and cavalry assault troops together in an innovative arrangement.
His son Alexander took this military machine and defeated all comers in the ancient world in a military
campaign that historians still consider with awe. The destruction of the Persian empire of Darius III
dramatically changed the political arrangements of his time and did so by the application of the superior
military capabilities of a relatively small force and the shock effect of rapid mobility. 
Given the rapid changes in technology and political power in the last few decades the argument in this paper
is in part that the RMA should not be divorced from considerations of geopolitics. In particular how military
power uses and dominates spaces, both terrestrial, and now too in earth orbits outside the atmosphere, has
become linked to the discussion of geopolitics, the geography of danger, and what kind of world order is
being secured by these new high technology forces. How a geopolitical environment is understood by
decision makers is key to planning and strategy; the designation of the ‘global war on terror’ as global well
before the phrase morphed into ‘the long war’ matters because literally the whole planet is now seen as at
least a potential battle space. 
Combined with the technology of television cameras, and the frequent use of ‘successful’ hits by precision
guided weapons as part of military and political briefings, one crucial question is whether the RMA has
changed politics at the largest scale, and if so how this is understood by policymakers and politicians in many
places. Beier (2006) argues that the framing and selection of targets has changed the social depth of warfare;
enlarging the potential participants in warfare, not least because ‘surgical strikes’ with precision guided
weapons supposedly reduces collateral damage, and hence allows their use where previous technologies
would not have been employed. This paper suggests that this is also a matter of the geopolitical framing, of
the representation of the world as a military arena at the largest scale which is implicitly, and sometimes
explicitly, about a new understanding of geopolitics where war can now happen anywhere and anytime. 
To make this argument the paper turns first to classical geopolitical thinking, nuclear strategy, and the theme
of the containment of Soviet power in the Eurasian landmass. Then it looks to the military technologies of
the RMA and their development in the latter stages of the cold war. Subsequently the paper examines the
geopolitical logic of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the popular articulation of the Bush doctrine
in Thomas Barnett’s (2004, 2005) writing, with its explicit remapping of the world as the context for
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understanding the doctrine and the necessity of warfare in the Middle East and elsewhere. Much of the
commentary on the war on terror, American foreign policy, the Bush doctrine, and Middle Eastern politics
has bypassed these most basic geopolitical ideas that structure American strategy. Including these themes
explicitly in the discussions matters not only for completeness, but because thinking about alternative
formulations of security after the Bush doctrine requires, among other things, a coming to terms with its
geopolitical categories.
GEOPOLITICS AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
Much of the praise or blame for contemporary geopolitical thinking is attributed to British geographer Halford
Mackinder and his much cited 1904 paper on the ‘geographical pivot of history’. In his formulations he
looked to central Asia as the key to world power, arguing that it offered a pivot or ‘heartland’ region that was
invulnerable to naval power and hence provided a base from which global dominance could be asserted. If
the Eurasian landmass came under the control of a single power, then the Oceanic realms would inevitably
be weaker in resources and military capabilities and global domination by the ‘world island’ would be
possible. Subsequently Nicholas Spykman (1942)  modified Mackinder’s argument suggesting that the
Eurasian littoral, what he called the Rimlands, was the key to world power. Ensuring that no power dominated
this region and its population and resources was, he argued, key to ensuring that world politics avoided the
dominance of a single power. Subsequently these concerns were loosely incorporated into various versions
of the American containment strategies of the cold war period. 
In partial contrast the American military historian Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) emphasized the importance
of naval power in the success of states in international rivalry suggesting that trading states that could control
sea communication would thrive as a result of commerce while landlocked states without access to the sea
were at a disadvantage. But geography suggests that there are some key “chokepoints” on the “sea lanes of
communication” (SLOC), and military control of these can be very important. Keeping the Straits of Hormuz
and the Straits of Malacca open continues to be  a matter of great concern for American naval planners to
ensure that oil tankers sail and that global commerce continues uninterrupted (Blair and Lieberthal 2007). 
The Second World War had produced a whole new inventory of weapons and technologies that in some ways
apparently rendered the geographical invulnerability of Mackinder’s geographical pivot, or heartland, in
central Asia outdated. Long range so called ‘strategic’ bombers carrying nuclear weapons could clearly range
across Asia and attack bases or factories located there. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with
even more powerful hydrogen bombs and capable of flying many thousands of miles apparently confirmed
the irrelevance of geographical factors in strategic thinking. At least they did so for a while in the 1950s and
1960s in American thinking where the geographical factors were less important than game theoretic
calculations of likely scenarios for nuclear conflict.
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With both the Americans and Soviets apparently capable of mutually destroying each other’s societies and
war making capabilities by the late 1960s, a state of  mutually assured destruction (MAD) then apparently
applied and geography was supposedly effectively irrelevant to nuclear strategy. But it wasn’t irrelevant to
political influence and the supposed necessity to contain the spread of Soviet influence. The American
intervention in Vietnam was justified in terms of preventing the fall of a dangerous ‘domino’ in the Rimlands
to what was portrayed, despite the earlier Sino-Soviet split, as a global communist expansion. But the military
forces the U.S. used were constrained both by political calculations and the inappropriate forces and
equipment available for a sustained tropical counter insurgency campaign.
In the 1970s, with the practical deadlock between the superpowers as a result of the MAD standoff, classical
geopolitics once again re-emerged in strategic thinking. Colin Gray (1977) led the way arguing that because
of the nuclear deadlock, control over territory and resources once again mattered in international power
struggles. Effectively the heartland was once again invulnerable because American nuclear weapons couldn’t
be used due to MAD. Hence, Gray argued, the verities of Mackinder and Spykman mattered once more and
American military planners needed to think about their strategies in these terms. 
He subsequently outlined a sophisticated argument for a nuclear theory of victory for nuclear planners in the
West based in part on these ideas (Gray 1979). But one of the key overlooked parts of his analysis in the
1970s and early 1980s debates about nuclear weapons was how he extended his geopolitical analysis to
interpret the structure of Soviet power in geographical terms (Dalby 1990). Gray’s argument was that the
Soviet system had inherited an imperial structure of rule with the peripheral parts only loosely integrated into
the Russian/Soviet state. Thus, he argued, it was possible to devise a plausible set of war targets that would
effectively paralyze the Soviet command structure by destroying key links in this highly centralized
arrangement hence preventing it controlling the peripheries of its empire. He further argued that this could
be done in a way that the Soviet Union couldn’t counter effectively and hence the Soviet Union would be
deterred from attempting to completely dominate Mackinder’s world island.  
Gray’s reinvention of nuclear strategy depended in part on his insistence on putting the geographical
dimensions of classical geopolitics and strategic thinking back into the discussion and linking it up with
Clausewitz’s thinking about war as the extension of politics. Thus strategy was about a clear political end;
forces should be constructed to give politicians options in a crisis, options that in the case of the cold war
were designed to make sure that nothing the Soviet Union did would prevent the United States from acting.
But to make these strategies plausible required weapons that were accurate enough to target Soviet nuclear
facilities and communications links. Accurate counterforce weapons rather than the less accurate counter-
value city busters of the MAD era in the 1960s were needed. 
INNOVATION AND “ASTROPOLITICS”
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With enough of these accurate weapons in place, and the Trident and Pershing II missile systems, air launched
cruise missiles, and mobile MX ICBMs were designed with such accuracy in mind that it might be possible
to launch a plausible first strike on the Soviet Union. The 1980s forward deployed maritime strategy of
hunting down and sinking Soviet ballistic missile submarines to remove that part of their deterrent forces was
part of this thinking. All of which would, of course, be much assisted by effective anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) systems to deny the Soviet Union the capability of launching its few remaining missiles in a
retaliatory second strike. This compellance capability would then ensure that the Soviet Union was deterred
in all plausible circumstances. While Ronald Reagan’s strategic defense initiative (SDI) was justified in terms
of its providing a missile shield to protect the United States, strategists understood that if it ever worked it
would only do so against a limited retaliatory strike. 
But both the putative plans for an SDI system and for first strike capable counter force weapons required huge
advances in electronics, both in terms of computational power, navigation, sensors, and communications
capabilities. Surveillance and coordination were at the heart of such technical innovations; both were required
to monitor the huge spaces of the globe over which such a nuclear war would be fought. Survivability and
redundancy were key and technologies which subsequently became commonplace in the internet had their
origins in these strategic innovations. Thus the links between strategy in the cold war and the contemporary
RMA are quite direct. American decisions in the 1970s to emphasize these technological advantages in
command, control, intelligence, and coordination on the battlefield, as well as such things as ‘stealth’ aircraft,
fit with these strategic innovations (Sloan 2002). Once the American draft was abolished in the 1970s a
smaller professional military would also clearly need technological superiority to cope with Soviet
conventional forces in Europe and elsewhere. 
The RMA promised to deliver this superiority and did so in particular with aerial weapons and targeting.
Guidance systems designed for nuclear cruise missiles to fight the Soviet Union are not that different from
those subsequently used to deliver non-nuclear explosives to government facilities in Belgrade or Baghdad
in the 1990s, or destroy buildings in villages in remote parts of Somalia in 2008 in hopes of killing Al Qaeda
members. Likewise strategies designed to compel the Soviet rulers to accede to American policy by using
precise targeting to cut key command links in their system are not so very different from those designed to
disrupt Milosevic’s or Hussein’s control of their forces. But the land based military forces designed in the
1980s to fight a conventional tank battle war in Europe were not so easily adapted to fight the new wars of
the 1990s (McGregor 1997) and now the war on terror. Nonetheless the assumptions that communications
technology and surveillance systems would allow battle space dominance were key to many parts of the air-
land battle doctrinal innovations of the US forces in the 1980s.
Navigation and coordination of forces, especially in deserts and on oceans, is tremendously facilitated by
reliable global positioning systems and the growing use of space based surveillance and communications.
Targeting ‘smart bombs’ likewise, satellite photography allows for frequent monitoring of targets and the
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potential to switch surveillance rapidly without moving land based forces. The ability of American
commanders to control drones and unmanned vehicles operating in Afghanistan and Iraq from bases in the
United States both allows for ease of control and safety for operators distant from combat zones. All this is
made possible by space based communication satellites. But this in turn makes American forces, dependent
on their superior coordination and their ability to react faster than opponents on the battlefield because they
can see what’s going on better, vulnerable to the disruption of this infrastructure, in particular in space where
so many communications satellites and monitoring systems are now situated.
Here too updated geopolitical thinking, sometimes referred to as ‘Astropolitics,’ has investigated the problems
of controlling key parts of the ‘new high ground,’ and the chokepoints which are effectively key orbits in
outer space (Dolman 2002). But as the anti-satellite weapon test the Chinese undertook in early 2007 suggests
very clearly, this American infrastructure of communication is at least potentially vulnerable to disruption
by relatively cheap countermeasures. Dominating near earth orbit is a preoccupation of space war thinkers;
the assumption that it conveys considerable strategic advantage is a powerful one if one also assumes that
state rivalries for world power are such that other states have an active interest in challenging the American
presence there, and once established in space would actively seek to render satellites vulnerable. At least in
a struggle with Al Qaeda or a military campaign in Iran or Korea, these space systems are not yet in danger;
but in a major war they clearly would be.
GLOBAL WARFARE
In the aftermath of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disappearance of much of its military
capability, and declarations by George Bush senior of a new world order, American military planners began
to think about the new situation and what might be done with American dominance. The Gulf war in 1991
was to a very substantial extent an old fashioned air and tank war, but one where the new technologies were
field tested apparently with great success. Although most of the munitions used in 1991 weren’t ‘smart,’ the
war story became one of the success of these bombs which apparently allowed allied victory with minimal
casualties against a clearly outclassed foe (Beier 2006). The logistical effort to assemble the army in the desert
had also clearly suggested the capabilities for American force projection across the region.
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The potential to use this superiority to assert American dominance round the globe, to prevent future
challenges to American dominance even emerging became a key theme in what subsequently emerged as the
neo-conservative view of the appropriate place of American power in the post cold war world (Dalby 2006).
Geopolitics had morphed from a concern with European battlefields and nuclear standoff with the Soviets
into a more general concern with maintaining American global dominance. Technological superiority should
allow American forces to intervene anywhere at relatively short notice. But the shambles in Mogadishu in
1993 took the lustre off assumptions that firepower and technological superiority was enough to ensure
effective policing of the world’s trouble spots. Nonetheless American military force  was soon again used in
the Balkans, and repeatedly to degrade Iraqi military capabilities in the 1990s. 
Then came the events of September 11th 2001 when an unanticipated attack by Al Qaeda suicide flyers
challenged the geopolitical premises of American thinking fundamentally. The focus in neo-conservative
thinking in the 1990s had been on states, not international terror operations as the primary focus of danger
to American dominance (Kagan and Kristol 2000). Afghanistan immediately became the locus for military
action in an arena for which there were few plans. The combination of airpower and money to buy the loyalty
of local warlords fairly quickly removed the Taliban regime but failed to either capture or kill key Al Qaeda
operatives. The capabilities of special forces and guided bombs suddenly suggested that the RMA had indeed
fundamentally changed warfare, and simultaneously that the cold war geography of conflict was irrelevant
(Rumsfeld 2002).
But quite why, when a few dissident Saudi Arabians and their Egyptian helpers hijacked some airliners in
the United States, and crashed them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, this necessarily required
a ‘global war’ response was very far from clear (Dalby 2003). One spectacular violation of American
sovereignty turned the whole globe explicitly into a combat zone in the updated map of American combatant
commanders areas of responsibility (Dalby 2007a). New national security doctrine statements and defense
strategy statements have subsequently emphasized the global reach of American forces and the apparent
necessity to build new ever more capable weapons systems and new bases in many parts of the world to
facilitate the rapid movement of forces to new zones of conflict. This new geopolitical specification of global
dangers provides the rationale for these new forces, weapons, and basing arrangements.
THE 2006 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
The long awaited February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), providing the basis for long-
term federal budget planning for the American Department of Defense, spells out these new geopolitical
circumstances. Much of the strategic argument in the report built on the previous year’s Defense Strategy of
the United States 2005 document. But the QDR does have a clear geopolitical vision and a plan to remake
the American armed forces in line with Rumsfeld’s (2002) ideas of transformation. It emphasizes a wartime
situation, one in which the United States is waging a ‘long war’ against terrorism. The forces needed to fight
this war have to be planned and built along appropriate lines to ensure that the US prevails. 
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Obviously engaging insurgents in Iraq or Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen or Afghanistan requires a very
different military from that required to fight Soviet tank divisions in Europe. But how different depends to
a large extent on how that arena of combat is understood; how, in short, the geopolitical imagination of
American strategists specifies, once again, the arena in which the country will be militarily engaged.
Throughout much of its history, the United States enjoyed a geographic
position of strategic insularity. The oceans and uncontested borders
permitted rapid economic growth and allowed the United States to spend
little at home to defend against foreign threats. The advent of long-range
bombers and missiles, nuclear weapons, and more recently of terrorist
groups with global reach, fundamentally changed the relationship between
U.S. geography and security. Geographic insularity no longer confers
security for the country. (QDR 2006: 24)
The QDR emphasizes the transformation from a peace-time military prepared to engage an enemy if
necessary to a battle-hardened and tested fighting entity constantly learning new lessons from the field and
transforming into a much more agile force. It outlines four priorities for the next few years: defeating terrorist
networks; defending the homeland in depth; shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and
preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. Not all
of these priorities suggest combat operations. The third priority clearly refers to diplomatic and political
action to prevent states from taking stances in opposition to American interests, ensuring that states are “with
us” not “with the terrorists,” following President George W. Bush’s rhetoric in the aftermath of September
11th 2001 (Bush 2001).  Shaping the political environment rather than waiting for hostile forces to emerge
is crucial to strategy in the global war on terror.
This geopolitical specification of the world is however complemented by one in which a layered defense of
the homeland of the USA is at the heart of these new structures. Hence homeland defense gets priority, and
the revived plans for missile defense are part of this protection of the continental United States. Beyond this
is a series of layered zones of decreasing importance. Ensuring the inviolate spatial protection of the
homeland is the lynchpin to all this, security of the base of operations is the first priority because only with
that accomplished can American forces undertake their expeditions abroad. The 2006 National Security
Strategy of the United States statement makes it clear that these will probably be required in support of the
overarching national security objective of the United States which is now nothing less than ending tyranny
on earth. Rather than containing the Soviet Union, a strategy of preventing the expansion of a hostile power,
the new geopolitical specifications now suggests an offensive strategy to remove dangerous regimes and
expand the remit of liberty understood in terms of liberal economies, international trade arrangements, and
at least some bilateral cooperation agreements between the United States and other regimes. The apparent
success of the weapons provided by the RMA in changing regimes in Belgrade, Baghdad, and Kabul
supposedly suggests the potential utility of these forces in this new geopolitical situation. 
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The current reorganization of military bases around the world is understood as a move from Cold War
garrisons to a posture designed for the rapid launching of expeditionary forces. The reorganization of the
army in particular into smaller brigade-sized units is designed to facilitate rapid deployment ‘surges’ into
‘trouble spots.’ Joint operations between the various services are given priority in contrast to the previous
separation of tasks and roles. New and asymmetric threats are the focus rather than earlier assumptions of near
peer competition with rising states. Insofar as there is a guide to fighting this new war, the author given pride
of place is T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), whose attack on Ottoman-held Aqaba during the First World War is
cited as the kind of indirect surprise assault that the United States is planning to use against Al Qaeda and
other networks of terrorists (Lawrence 1935; see also Barnett 2006).  
This is clearly a global war, one in which American troops are dispersed around the world to carry out a huge
number of assignments, from training to intelligence-gathering. More specifically, “[o]n any given day, nearly
350,000 men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces are deployed or stationed in approximately 130 countries.
They are battle-hardened from operations over the past four years, fighting the enemies of freedom as part
of this long war”(QDR 2006: 9). But they are also involved in disaster relief, in the aftermath of the Indian
Ocean Tsunami in late 2004, the earthquake in Pakistan in late 2005, and various other emergency situations.
Intervention in Liberia in 2003 is also mentioned in the QDR, as are drug interdictions in Columbia and
numerous other operations, many by small liaison and training teams who rarely garner any media attention.
The U.S. military is thus proud of its earth-spanning presence, with troops in two-thirds of the sovereign
states on the planet. 
However, given the acknowledged global scope of the U.S. armed forces, and the expressed desire to remake
distant societies so as to stifle the emergence of threats to the metropolitan centre, it is not much of a stretch
to argue that imperial pacification is the mandate of the war on terror, and that a debate over the semantics
of empire is unnecessary (Johnston 2007; Kaplan 2005, 2007). As the QDR’s (2006: 21-22) authors put it:
Victory will come when the enemy’s extremist ideologies are discredited
in the eyes of their host populations and tacit supporters, becoming
unfashionable, and following other discredited creeds, such as Communism
and Nazism, into oblivion. This requires the creation of a global
environment inhospitable to terrorism. It requires legitimate governments
with the capacity to police themselves and to deny terrorists the sanctuary
and the resources they need to survive. It also will require support for the
establishment of effective representative civil societies around the world,
since the appeal of freedom is the best long-term counter to the ideology of
the extremists.
This sweeping declaration, also present (in similar form) in the paradigmatic 2002 National Security Strategy
of the United States, and in the 2006 update, not only reprises the ideological character of the Cold War, but
equally gestures to the Clinton administration’s foreign policy of ‘enlargement’ of the area ruled by
democratic states.
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Even so, the military globalism of the war on terror is predicated on a fundamental change in the specification
of America’s place in the world. The homeland must be defended in depth because globalization has rendered
it insecure. While acknowledging the many economic benefits of globalization, the QDR goes on to argue
that “it is also accelerating the transmission of disease, the transfer of advanced weapons, the spread of
extremist ideologies, the movement of terrorists, and the vulnerability of major economic segments” (QDR
2006:24). The complexity and speed of these threats, again, requires pre-emptive forms of strategy,
particularly in the form of constant surveillance and international collaboration. A long list of possibilities
and contingencies follows, outlining ways in which states and extremists might launch attacks on America
to cause catastrophic damage.  
But why the United States might be a target is not seriously considered; its given geopolitical status as
endangered is just that: a given, for the Department of Defense. This insistence on the fundamental virtue of
the United States is the corollary of the long war; if the US is endangered it has to be due to some external
cause. Such causes justify the transformation of that external environment, by force if necessary; and new
mobile expeditionary forces designed to “shape the future” rather than respond to threatening contingencies
are outlined in the QDR. But the QDR explicitly states that the expeditionary forces will be based mostly in
the United States but be ‘surged’ rapidly to wherever they are needed round the globe; clearly threats are now
understood in a geopolitical specification of the whole planet as a potential battle space. Strategic lift
capacities will be combined with these new bases to ensure rapid deployment anywhere in the globe that
American forces are needed in the new global arena of conflict. No longer will regional commands ‘own’ the
forces assigned to their theatre of operations; they instead will provide the command structure while the
logistical tasks of surging forces will be conducted at a global scale. Here the RMA meets the new
geopolitical arrangements for conducting war anytime anywhere.
It is all too easy to emphasize novelty in the QDR document, and to suggest that the transformation of the
American military is moving ahead rapidly as a result of a new geopolitical vision. But as critics of the QDR
were very quick to point out, many major weapons programs of the past are proceeding apace with no
apparent compelling new missions in the immediate war on terror (Kaplan 2006; Conetta 2006). More flexible
army units and expanded unmanned aircraft drones are prioritized, but so too are new submarines, carriers,
and over 2000 joint strike fighters. According to the QDR there is an American military presence in some 130
states, as well as an unchallenged Navy, Air Force, and a global surveillance system, all of which suggests
that American power is understood as a global presence; geopolitics is now about the administration of much
of the globe; Spykman’s Rimlands in particular. But it is now also about taking the war to various putative
enemies and using preemption if necessary to remove regimes deemed threatening. Replacing them with
states that are active participants in the international regime of American lead economic liberty is key to this
struggle to eliminate tyranny as both the 2002 and 2006 versions of the National Security Strategy make clear.
SHAPING THE FUTURE
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The most explicit popular representation of this new strategy of removing threats and shaping the future, and
the argument for new forces needed to make it effective, is probably in popular author, pundit, blogger
(www.thomasbarnett.com) and Pentagon consultant, Thomas Barnett’s books, The Pentagon’s New Map
(2004) and Blueprint for Action (2005). What is interesting about these representations of geopolitics is not
only Barnett’s explicit use of one key cartographic aid in dividing the world into a developed integrated core
economy region, and a non-integrated gap in need of, if necessary, forcible integration into the global
economy, but also his direct connection of this geopolitical understanding to the debate about force
transformation. He explicitly argues that not only does America need to have an overwhelming preponderance
of force available, a ‘Leviathan force,’ to remove recalcitrant regimes, but it also needs what he calls a system
administration force designed to rebuild economies and societies after the local dictators are gone. He argues
that this is what is needed to ensure that the wild and dangerous zones in the non-integrated gap, where
terrorists and criminals plot their evil plans, do not revert to their threatening activities, is a combination of
peacebuilding, development, and civil administrators who can teach a presumably grateful local population
the ways of the Western world so they too can take advantages of the benefits of being plugged into the global
economy.
He contrasts this vision with a very prevalent one in American geopolitical thinking, one focused on great
powers and the assumption that history shows that one will inevitably arise to challenge American leadership
(see Grygiel 2006). In particular Barnett challenges the geopolitical assumption that great powers are still
relevant as actors on the world stage. Neither is he interested in world islands, nor the traditional geopolitical
theme of the rivalry of sea and land powers. Instead he posits a world divided into a zone of prosperity
threatened by the non-integrated gap. Arguing that China would prefer to trade than fight, he suggests a grand
alliance of globalizing powers to finally subdue the recalcitrant peripheries; final victory for civilization is
possible if only the forces of global modernity recognize their common interest in removing the remaining
rogue states and their sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and other threats to global prosperity. Such a
contrast of geopolitical perspectives throws the discussion of the  RMA into sharp relief by posing the key
questions of grand strategy at the heart of this geopolitics and asking how the world is specified so as to
require these forms of military conduct. Barnett also explicitly suggests the possibility of a final victory in
‘the long war’ when the gap has finally been integrated, in contrast to the realist pessimism of inevitable
interminable great power rivalries. 
What has been so painfully revealed by the relative neglect of Afghanistan and the lack of any clear plan to
administer Iraq after the 2003 invasion, is the limitations of the RMA in terms of its abilities to accomplish
practical tasks of reconstruction and pacification in the aftermath of its combat successes (Ricks 2006).
Clearly the American forces have gained much in terms of combat power by the adoption of the new
technologies and their ability to relatively effortlessly remove weak and marginal military forces in both Iraq
and Afghanistan. But Barnett’s criticism is precisely that while this may be necessary, it is not sufficient for
the current geopolitical circumstances. This is not the only kind of military capability that the United States
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needs in the situations it faces. The RMA was about technology designed to defeat conventional armies. It
is tied to a geopolitical vision of a world of competing states, and specifically of competing great powers in
a rivalry for global power and influence. 
After the disaster in Vietnam where the army disgraced itself in a war it could not win, and the Air Force used
excessive violence to no obvious strategic purpose, the officer corps decided to abandon counter-insurgency
operations and training and focus on the rebuilding of the forces to defeat what they understood as the main
potential enemy of the time, the Soviet forces in Europe. In focusing on other states, and the importance of
major combat operations, the other function of militaries through the ages, that of occupation, administration,
and enforcement of rule on reluctant populations, has been largely abandoned (Ricks 2006). Now in Iraq and
Afghanistan the American military has been forced to dust off the old lessons of counter-insurgency and
reinvent the doctrines and tactics that it stopped teaching and training for in the 1970s. 
The focus on military operations as they merge into criminality and policing, and propaganda and media
strategies, and do so in ill-defined terrains where national borders seem to count for little suggests that the
precise geographies of the conflict are not clear, and boundaries and borders are much less important than
they used to be when geopolitics was about superpower blocs. Mary Kaldor (2007) talks about this in terms
of what she calls “organized violence” in a global era. Diasporic urban populations support nationalist
movements ‘back’ in the homeland. Resources controlled by rebels are sold on the international commodity
markets to raise weapons to fight what are not strictly speaking ‘civil’ wars. Criminality and militias merge
as struggles over local economies and the loyalty of populations take precedence over fights for territory. This
is the new geography of violence in the ‘new wars’ of the twenty first century, a violence which the RMA
has not equipped Western forces to fight effectively over the long term. 
FUTURE GEOPOLITICAL THREATS?
Through 2007 there was much discussion of the possibilities of an American or Israeli attack on Iran,
ostensibly to prevent the emergence of a nuclear weapons capable Iranian state. While there has been endless
speculation about its likelihood, and much expression of alarm at the folly of extending the war in the Middle
East, there has been much less discussion of the strategic logic of an attack on Tehran. In terms of the 2006
National Security Strategy, and the 2006 QDR in particular, it is clear that such an attack is entirely consistent
with the logic of the Bush doctrine. Removing regimes that might potentially provide weapons of mass
destruction to terrorists or use them directly against American forces is what the doctrine states is its major
priority on the road to victory. Iran would thus seem to be the next state in line to be attacked.
 
If it happens, an air assault on Iran using the latest smart weapons to disable the Iranian military and at least
some of its nuclear capabilities, is entirely within the parameters of the doctrine. But its goal would clearly
be regime change as part of the strategy to end tyranny. Given the limited ground troops likely to be available
the model would appear to be Serbia in 1999 where a major air assault on the state’s infrastructure had the
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eventual political effect of removing Milosevic from power. Sanctions and political pressure in addition to
the practical disruption of economic life made the regime untenable in the medium term. While the initial
assault on the Iranian military and revolutionary guards would no doubt foster nationalist support for the
regime, the strategy would presumably look to short or medium term political destabilization to deal with the
Mullahs who would hopefully, from the American viewpoint, be incapable of providing basic needs in the
aftermath of the American assault. But such calculations do require that the Iranian threats to retaliate against
oil infrastructure and shipping in the Gulf are discounted as likely to be ineffective (Blair and Lieberthal
2007). What North Korea might do in such a crisis, given that it would then certainly expect to be the next,
or perhaps next after Syria to be attacked, rarely gets a mention.
An American assault on Iran, should it transpire, also requires that the rest of the world at least acquiesce to
this military action and that such an attack does not set in motion political trends that work to constrain the
future possibilities for American unilateral actions. Here the logic of the doctrine runs into political
difficulties if the international community becomes convinced that America is operating, not as the sheriff
in Colin Gray’s phrase (2004), policing a basically benign world order, but as an aggressive and self
interested power acting to maintain its dominance. Key to all this is whether the rest of the world shares a
basic understanding of the geopolitical map with the United States, and whether even if they do, they have,
after Afghanistan and Iraq, any confidence that the strategy of regime change will succeed. If key players
don’t accept the basic premise of ending tyranny, shrinking the gap, and periodically using force to do so in
the name of expanding economic liberty qua globalization, then the possibilities for the long war precipitating
a further reshaping of geopolitical matters looms.
If international institutions are once again ignored in a unilateral operation then the possibilities for great
power rivalry emerging and once again redrawing geopolitical lines of confrontation are considerable.
Military buildups, strategic forces designed to fight wars that do not provide the American high tech weapons
with target sets, and alliances on the Eurasian continent to challenge the American presence in South West
Asia are all possibilities. Such arrangements might be accelerated if Iranian resistance to American attacks
included destruction of petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf and enough destabilization there to disrupt oil
flows long enough to precipitate a substantial global economic recession. Such a crisis would no doubt be
used as a powerful political argument for the continued militarization of American foreign policy, fulfilling
the worst fears of those who see current events in imperial terms, and as the end of the American republic
(Bacevich 2005; Johnston 2007). The international repercussions would be very considerable but are
impossible to predict.
In 2007 further doubt was cast on the appropriateness of the military capabilities of the current RMA for
dealing with future security challenges, and the appropriateness of the geopolitical specification of the world
that underlies the Bush doctrine. The discussion of climate change and the possible disruptions to many
societies in the near future has once again come to prominence in policy making circles; little in the RMA
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is much help in dealing with such threats which emanate from, in Thomas Barnett’s terms, the core rather than
from the gap. While military planners are now beginning to wonder what kind of threats climate disruptions
may present and how they might better prepare, equip, and train to deal with disasters, forced migration, and
other disruptions (CNA Corporation 2007; Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2007), clearly a
fossil fueled global military is part of the cause of such disruptions.  
While surveillance systems and mobile forces have considerable potential for dealing with these difficulties,
once again the key question of the geopolitical assumptions made by political and military planners will be
important. Building forces to deal with emergencies but not direct military threats, is not what the recent
military revolution has been about, but military operations other than war are clearly part of what armed
forces do currently. If climate change sets migration in motion on a large scale, then all sorts of more serious
problems may require military attention (Smith 2007), but preventing climate disaster and preparing societies
for the coming changes, is not something that the current revolution in military affairs equips contemporary
states to do. Numerous space based technologies may have some uses in monitoring environmental changes
or facilitating communications in dealing with disasters, but they are not much use in reducing the human
disruptions of ecosystems. The overtly military response to the war on terror, and the geopolitical formulation
of security primarily in terms of regimes judged unfriendly to the American world order, diverts attention
from these other pressing policy necessities for the future, not least by precluding more cooperative ventures
in many places. 
Which ironically brings us back to the first revolution in military affairs mentioned at the beginning of this
paper. While Alexander had the military capability of defeating all foes he faced in the ancient world he was
powerless to prevent the destruction of most of his army in the  extreme environment of the desert dry lands
of what is now Iran. Geographical factors can no more be ignored today as they could have been then.
Understanding the environment and planning appropriately for how to encounter the future remains essential
to security; thinking carefully about the appropriate geopolitical specifications is the unavoidable first step.
If as Paul Rogers (2008) suggests, we have little choice but to think about security in sustainable terms in the
future, then rethinking contemporary geopolitical premises must be part of the process. Climate change
challenges contemporary formulations quite profoundly; geopolitical maps that place humanity within a small
biosphere that we are disrupting (Dalby 2007b), rather than on a planetary surface that Americans and their
friends are trying to control with precision guided weapons, will be an essential part of any such
reconfiguration of security priorities after the Bush doctrine has finally run its course.
NOTE
An earlier draft of part of this paper appears as “Geopolitik und die Transformation der Streitkräfte” in
Jan Helmig und Niklas Schörnig (2008) Die Transformation der Streitkräfte im 21. Jahrhundert.
Militärische und Politische Dimensionen, Frankfurt Am Main: Campus.
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